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PANAMA
THE EVENTS LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE
T
HE history of Panama is for the most part
identified with that of Colombia, which is
narrated elsewhere in the present volume. It will,
however, be convenient-to review certain movements
and tendencies of the last half-century in order to
obtain a just understanding of the position and
prospects of the new republic.
All the principles of advanced democratic govern-
ment were included in the programme of the party
which ruled Columbia from 1863-to 188, and the
statute books of the time afford ample proof that
the leaders earnestly tried to put those principles
into practical effect. They dreamed a Utopia, but
practically their efforts only aggravated the anar-
chical tendencies bequeathed by the Spaniards and
Bolivar. Colombian liberals still insist that a per-
sistent enforcement of the Constitution and prin-
ciples of x863 would ultimately transform the
character of the people—that religious bigotry and
priestly influence would gradually disappear; that
the progressive enlightenment of the masses would
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make military despotism and revolutions Impossible;
and that in process of time the relations of the states
to the federal government would reach a satisfactory
and workable basis. But so1 far as the experiment
went no progress was made toward unifying the
nation and pacifying the adverse elements. Discon-
tent, disorders, civil wars ixcreased in violence as
the years went by. Though one-fifth of the federal
revenues were spent on the , public school system,
and one-tenth of the children were nominal attend-
ants, the clergy were permitted to have no share in
their control, and tetaliated iby excommunicating
the parents. The devotedly pious Creole mothers
and wives, threatened with the closing of the con-
fessionals and the denial of absolution, threw their
incalculable influence against 1 the atheistic govern-
ment. The destruction of the convents and the
confiscation of the vast ecclesiastical estates vio-
lently changed the ownership of two-thirds of the
land in the confederation, but this imposition of
new landlords on the industrious, oppressed, half-
enslaved tenantry did not much modify real agri-
cultural conditions. No extensive subdivision of
estates resulted, and the Cteole aristocracy con-
tinued to pay more attention to political intrigue
than to improving their property.
Not less disappointing in its practical working
was the independence of the states. Not only did
the local bosses constantly abue autonomy for their
own selfish purposes, but thej presidents at Bogota
often ignored the constitutional rights of the states,
and selected for coercion precisly those states which
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were farthest from the caial and most needed
wide autonomous powers. IThough Panama's posi-
tion was isolated, its population cosmopolitan, its
commercial interests and social structure peculiar,
and though In colonial tiines its dependence on
Bogota had been only nominal, the liberal presi-
dents usually ruled it like la conquered province.
Members of the Andean oligarchy poured in to
batten on its revenues; the autonomy guaranteed
by the Constitution prove4 illusory, and discon-
tent led to repeated efforts to achieve absolute
independence.	 I
Rival ambitions among its' own leaders furnished,
however, the immediate caus I e of the downfall of the
liberal party. A close oligarchy grew up and that
inevitable corollary, a powerful faction of dissident
liberals, while the clericals remained formidable and
Irreconcilable even after their bloody overthrow in
1876. Rafael Nuftez, a brilliant writer, a resolute
and ambitious party chief, and a leader in the con-
fiscation of church property, had been defeated In his
candidacy for the presidency in 1875. The younger
and dissatisfied liberals rallied behind him in his war
against the oligarchy, and in I 88 the old-fashioned
liberals could not prevent his election to the presi-
dency. He vigorously strengthened the prerogatives
of the federal executive and buflt up his personal
following, but although the issue of paper money
and the discontinuance of interest on the foreign
debt—a debt which only ten years before had been
scaled down to $6,000,000, one-sixth its original
amount, on a solemn promise that at least this much
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would be faithfully paid—placed large funds at his
disposal, the old-line liberals were strong enough to
prevent his re-election in 1832. Their victory was
illusory and temporary. Nunez controlled both
houses of congress and was able to block President
Zaldua at every turn. Eighty years old and in
feeble health, the latter died after a year of fruitless
struggle.
r -
STEAMERS ON THE MACDALENA RIVER.
After a short ad interim administration in which
N ufiez's influence predominated, he was re-elected
to the presidency and installed in 1884. By this
time his centralising tendencies were manifest, and
the measures he adopted unmistakably pointed to
the substitution of a unified republic for the old
loose confederation. Many of his liberal supporters
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became mere administrative divisions whose, gov-
ernors were appointed from Bogota; the presidential
term was increased to six years; the radical liberal
projects were abandoned; the clergy regained many
of their privileges; and the historical conservatives
continued the dominant party.
As long as Nunez lived there were few outbreaks
and no serious civil war, though the ousted liberals
never ceased to plot the government's overthrow.
The centralising system held the departments in a
rigid control from whose inconveniences Panama
suffered far more than the mountain districts.
Practically she was allowed no voice in either her
own or general affairs; the very delegates who
nominally represented her in the constitutional con-
vention of 1885 were residents of Bogott appointed
by Nunez; military rule became a permanent thing
on the Isthmus; all officials were strangers sent from
the Andean plateau; and the million dollars of taxes
wrung each year from the people of Panama were
spent on maintaining the soldiers who kept them in
subjection. In January, 1895, the harassed pro-
vince broke out in a rebellion which was suppressed
by an overwhelming force of Colombian troops in
April.
Meanwhile in Colombia proper the ôpposition to
the ruling clique grew stronger and stronger. Per-
secution united the libei'als, and they began or-
ganising for revolt all over the republic. The
conservatives themselves dividet into two parties
one of which opposed the administration. Nultez
did not live to finish the second term to which he
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resolute ministers, and in July, içoo, the vigorous
vice-president, Marroquin, seized power by a cotift
d'Etat, throwing Sanclemente into a prison, where
he remained until his death. Thereafter the war
against the rebels was prosecuted with more energy,
and the tide turned with the defeat of an army of
Venezuelans, eight thousand strong, which had in-
vaded the eastern provinces, to co-operate with the
insurrectionists.
However, the liberals were still strong in the
west and north. On the Isthmus four insurrections
had broken out from October, I x8g, to September,
igor, and though each had been promptly sup-
pressed, in 1902 the liberals were able to make a
last great effort to establish themselves at Panama.
They had considerable forces near the mouth of the
Magdalena, and gunboats on the Pacific. The secure
possession of the Isthmus would have enabled them
to reinforce this Magdalena arny, cut off Marroquin
from the sea, and undertake a ampaign against the
interior. At first all went well for them; their gun-
boats captured the government's vessels on the
Pacific side; they concentrate4 a respectable army
there and finally defeated and captured two thou-
sand of Marroquin's troops it Agua Dulce, near
Panama. But this was their int success. Marro.
quin poured reinforcements into Colon, and though
the American admiral at first Mused to allow them
to be transported over the rail 'road to Panama, per-
mission was granted when it ecame evident that
there would be no fighting rear the line. News
came of the defeat of the liberal army near the
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Magdalena, and General Herrera, the victor at Agua
Duke, found himself isolated. In desperation he
sent an expedition in October which surprised and
captured Colon, but French and American marines
were promptly landed to prevent fighting in that
city. The expedition had no alternative but to sur-
render, and a few days later General Herrera with
the main body capitulated on the Pacific side.
The three years of war left Colombia in frightful
demoralisation. The victorious government was
little better off than the defeated liberals. Coin-
merce and industry had been prostrated; revenues
had dwindled to nothing; the paper currency was
worth less than one per cent. The exhaustion of
its adversaries, not its own strength, enabled Mano-
quin's government to continue in power. In such
a situation the administration welcomed the oppor-
tunity which now offered of renewing the building of
the Isthmian canal. The United States government
determined to undertake this great work itself, and
finally decided in favour of Panama as against the
Nicaragua route. Forty million dollars was agreed
upon as a just price for the work already done by
the French Company, and nothing remained but to
obtain Colombia's consent to the transfer. The
civil war helped to delay the negotiation of a satis-
factory treaty, but as soon as it was over the Marro-
quin administration lost little time in coming to an
agreement with the United States. Colombia was
to receive a bonus of ten million dollars for consent-
ing to the transfer and enlarging the terms of the
original concession; her sovereign rights were
486	 p4NAMA
reserved and guaranteed, although she agreed to
police and sanitary control of the canal strip by the
United States.
When this treaty was submitted to the Colombian
Senate for ratification, opposition developed which
the administration was not stro4g or resolute enough
to overcome. Among the politicians at Bogota, the
opinion was almost universal that the executive
should have demanded more. iThe Colombian pea-
pie have ever regarded the political control of the
I'sthinus as their most valuable national heritage,
and cherished extravagant hop that some day they
would be vastly enriched by the' sale or rental of this
strategic bit of ground for its natural use as the great-
est artery of the world's commerce. Many now
insisted, as they had done in zSgS, on enforcing a for.
feiture of the French rights, S at least on receiving
a proportion of the $o,000,000 to be paid for them.
It was also said that the Americans could well afford
a larger bonus, and the opponents of the treaty made
the further point that the agreement was unconsti-
tutional and contained insufficient guaranties of Co-
lombian sovereignty. Against this stonn the feeble
administration probably could 
1 
6 little and certainly
did nothing. The Senate was allowed to adjourn
without ratifying the, treaty,i and an attempt was
made to negotiate a new one providing for a larger
bonus and more stringent guaranties of Colombian
sovereignty.
The 'United States, however, absolutely refused
to consider any other terms than those already
agreed upon, and the civilised world saw the corn.
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pletion of an enterprise promising incalculable
benefits to mankind indefinitely postponed by the
opposition of Andean provinces whom the accidents
of war and international politics had given an arbi-
trary control over i region with which they had no
natural connection. The situation was particularly
hard for the people of the Isthmus, whose confident
hopes were now disappointed of at last receiving,
by the prosperity which would follow the building
of the canal, some compensation for the oppression
and losses they had suffered during eighty years of
misrule by the Bogota oligarchies. Hardly had the
treaty been rejected when plotting for a declaration
of independence began. The resident population
was unanimous, and good grounds existed for be-
lieving that even the Colombian garrison would offer
no resistance unless reinforcements should come
from Bogota. In case of an armed conflict with
Colombia the people of Panama could count on the
sympathy of all America and Europe. The stock-
holders of the French Company had a direct pecu-
niary interest in their success. If once they could
establish independence and a defacft. government,
Colombia could not deliver an effective attack with-
out violating the neutrality and security of transit
guaranteed to the Isthmus by the United States.
Everything pointed to the success of a well-con-
ducted movement.
Though the preparations for the revolt could not
be concealed, the Bogota governmept took no
effective measures to forestall it. Warned that
trouble was impending, the United States sent
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ships to prevent fighting that might interfere with
transit. The new republic was proclaimed at
Panama on the 3rd of November, 1903. The Co-
lombian authorities made no resistance; the garrison
surrendered without firing a shot; and the entire
population 'acquiesced in the appointment of a pro-
visional government, pending the calling of a con-
vention and the adoption of a Constitution. A
small force of Colombians had been landed at Colon,
but the revolution at Panama found it still on the
Atlantic side. On November 4th the American
naval commander refused to give these troops per-
mission to use the railroad forr warlike purposes.
Because the vital portion of the new republic is
virtually neutral under the treaty of '846, the pro-
visional government having 4tabl1shed Itself
peaceable possession was safe from external attack.
The useless Colombian troops at Colon either joined
the people of Panama or retired. The inhabitants
of Colon and the outlying districts immediately sent
in their adherence, and the peace of the whole
Isthmian region remained unbroken. On the 13th
of November the United States recognised the new
republic, being followed by France on the i8th, and
then by all other nations as son as diplomatic for-
malities could be complied wit h. Dr. Manuel Ant-
ador Guerrero was elected first president of the
Republic of Panama, being inaugurated on Febru-
ary 19, 1904. A treaty with the United States for
the building of the canal was framed on substantially
the same lines as the one which: had been negotiated
with Colombia. By the end of February it had
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been ratified and proclaimed, and the United States
at once made preparations for the beginning of the
work.
